This paper analyses the highly contested concept of American exceptionalism, as 
Introduction
On the 10th of September 2013, Barak Obama gave a speech regarding the situation in Syria. At the end of the speech he said that "America is not the world's policeman… But when… we can stop children from being gassed to death… I believe we should act. That's what makes us exceptional" (Obama 2013a ). The following day, the New York Times published Vladimir Putin's text in which he made a comment about American exceptionalism: "[M]y working and personal relationship with President Obama is marked by growing trust. I appreciate this. I carefully studied his address to the nation on Tuesday. And I would rather disagree with a case he made on American Exceptionalism… It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation" (Putin 2013) . He also said that "the law is still the law, and we must follow it whether we like it or not" (Ibid.).
Putin's criticism gained a great deal of attention in the US media, and although Obama did not stop using the term 'American exceptionalism' he was criticised for not believing in it enough (File 2015) . The crisis in Ukraine other hand, different practices in American foreign policy might lead to a change in the discursive articulation of the concept in the purpose of adjustment of the identity with the current practice and consequential legitimisation of the practice.
In this paper we analyse the way Barak Obama uses the idea of American exceptionalism on two levels: US foreign policy and the US stance towards international law. Our main conclusion is that Obama uses implicit dual discourse in both these fields. In US foreign policy Obama predominantly uses the term 'American exceptionalism' as consists of an active foreign policy, favours a multilateral to a unilateral approach, and insists on the importance and efficiency of the soft power instruments of foreign policy instead of hard power. There is dualism present in Obama's discourse however, because his perception of activism in foreign policy is not without boundaries, unilateralism is not inconsistent with exceptionalism, and "smart" use and the development of hard power are also acknowledged as important.
Similarly, in the context of the US stance towards international law, Obama regularly states that America should not be exempt from international legal order, and that what makes the US exceptional is not an ability to flout international norms and the rule of law, but the willingness to confirm them through US actions. Obama's discourse in the field of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, however, reveals that he is trying to "maintain the right" of the US to use force whenever it is in accordance with their own national interest.
This research paper consists of six chapters. After the introduction, we explain in Chapter II the analytical framework of our research. In Chapter III we briefly explain the genealogy of 'American exceptionalism'. In
Chapter IV we analyse Obama's discourse on American exceptionalism towards US foreign policy. In the fifth chapter we apply the same analysis to Obama's discourse on American exceptionalism in international law.
Finally, in Chapter VI we make concluding remarks.
Analytical Framework
Theorists of international relations (IR) have recently paid more attention to the concept of American exceptionalism, as an important part of US identity. American exceptionalism is probably one of the most important elements of US identity. As Restad (2012: 53) Social constructivism places special emphasis on identity. For constructivists, identity is a key issue in the construction of reality, since "the more we act toward an entity as if it has a particular representation or meaning, the more that entity can take on that representation" (Najak and Malone 2015: 256). The poststructuralist approach also places special emphasis on identity. It considers identity and (foreign) policy as mutually constitutive and discursively linked (Hansen 2006: 25) . Adjustments to both practice (policy) and identity are possible through discourse. The goal of foreign policy actors "is to present foreign policy that appears legitimate and enforceable to its relevant audience" (Hansen 2006: 26) .
For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to conclude that the concept of American exceptionalism is generally considered relevant in the analysis of American foreign policy, and especially in the US attitude towards international law. In this paper, we accept this widespread attitude. We additionally underline the thesis of Hughes (2015: 528) , explaining that the relevance of this concept for IR scholars is "that it provides a cultural mechanism for legitimating foreign policy decisions and practices". Since there is no single and fixed meaning of this concept, we find it theoretically and practically relevant to explain how Barak Obama, as a key US foreign policy decision-maker, understands and uses this concept. It is a first and necessary step for any further theorisation of the influence of this aspect of US identity in its foreign policy.
In order to conduct our research, we focus on the way President Obama uses the concept of American exceptionalism in his speeches related to foreign policy and international law issues. We therefore use a method of discourse analysis. The objects of our analysis are Obama's public speeches. We do not specifically analyse Obama's foreign policy practice outside the discourse.
Despite the fact that there is no single and fixed meaning of American exceptionalism, there were some patterns (or "genres") of its use in history.
Prescriptions of different patterns for US foreign policy and stance towards international law are especially important for our analysis. In order to clarify Obama's understanding of the concept in foreign policy and international law issues, we will, therefore, adopt a two-level research framework:
1. Secondary source literature review -which will make it possible for us to locate different "genres" in the meaning of American exceptionalism in the context of foreign policy and international law;
2. Analysis of the primary sources (Obama's speeches) -which will enable us to classify Obama's American exceptionalism discourse in these genres of meaning. Smith (1994) calls 'the American Mission' -the possibility of spreading democracy around the globe, and "make of world a better place".
The notion of American exceptionalism
The poststructuralist approach adopted by Pease (2009: 9) considered American exceptionalism as a national "fantasy", composed of "incompatible elements", which actually made it possible to survive and adapt to different circumstances. He considered the evolution of this concept as a way of "othering" primarily of the Soviet Union, but also of Europe and the so-called 'third world' (Pease 2009: 10-11 We thus expand our model in comparison with McCriksen's conventional dichotomous model and adjust the content of his main dichotomy to the findings of the critics. The model that will be used in this work to analyse foreign policy oriented aspects of American exceptionalism discourse is based on three different dichotomies.
The first is the dichotomy between: a) active foreign policy, and b) passive foreign policy. For the reasons explained above, we find this a more appropriate dichotomy than isolationism/internationalism. The second dichotomy is the dichotomy between: a) unilateralism, and b)
multilateralism. This distinction helps us to clarify whether the prescriptions derived from discourse are tied to the unilateral US role in the international politics, or to a multilateral approach which seeks to find more partners for the US. Finally, as Stretch and Mara ( We believe that these three dichotomies present, historically, the most important variations in the discursive framing of this concept. In the following chapter, we will try to locate Obama's use of this discourse in one of the three categories (genres) on both scales.
American exceptionalism is not an essentially contested concept only in the field of foreign policy. Its connection or even tension with the norms of international law is well established (Ignatieff 2009; Koh 2003; Posner and Bredford 2011, etc.) . Unfortunately, the dichotomies that we The doctrine of international law reveals different interpretations of the influence of the use of the concept of American exceptionalism in international law norms. Koh (2003 Koh ( : 1482 , for example, states that "the term "American exceptionalism" has been used far too loosely and without meaningful nuance". This is why he suggests four possible meanings of American exceptionalism: distinctive rights, different labels, the "flying buttress" mentality, and double standards (Koh 2003 (Koh : 1483 . At the same time he finds that the most dangerous meaning of American exceptionalism is the last one -double standards. By double standards Koh means a situation in which "the United States proposes that a different rule should apply to itself than applies to the rest of the world" (Koh 2003 (Koh : 1486 .
Another relevant example is Ignatieff's three different interpretations of the concept of American exceptionalism: the first is connected with the USA reservations, non-ratification or non-compliance of human rights and humanitarian law conventions (Ignatieff 2009: 3) . The second is encompassed by the term 'double standards' -"judging itself and its friends by more permissive criteria than it does its enemies" (ibid). The third is connected with USA denial of the jurisdiction of human rights law within its own domestic law. apply to all states except for one particular state" (Ignatieff 2009: 7) . To conclude, they believe that there is an American exceptionalism which is not so very different from that of the Chinese one or that of the European Union, but that there is no such thing as American Exemptionalism.
For the purpose of this analysis, we are not going to use this distinction between the terms exceptionalism and exemptionalism. The main reason for this is that we are going to analyse Obama's discourse about the American stance towards international law. Obama does not use the term exemptionalism, although he sometimes criticises a practice that could be very similar to this concept. We are thus going to treat the term exemptionalism as part of the term exceptionalism.
Ultimately, we would like to emphasise that the sovereign equality of states as a general principle of international law does not mean an absolute legal equality of all states in international community (Simpson 2004) . In other words, in some specific areas of international law, some states could be an exception, such as when great powers, including the United States, have a special legal status in certain situations (the most obvious example is the status of permanent membership in Security Council). It is, however, important to bear in mind that this special legal status is accepted by other subjects in the international community. Otherwise, we are dealing with the unilateral promotion of so-called exceptionalism, which is used only to legitimize violations of the international law norms.
Obama's discourse on American exceptionalism and US foreign policy
Foreign policy connotations and prescriptions are an integral part of the American exceptionalism discourse. President Obama often used this concept in his speeches, even more so than George W. Bush (Gilmore 2013: 77-78) . Despite this, President Obama was widely criticised for his "lack of belief" in American exceptionalism by conservative politicians such as Mitt Romney (Rucker 2012) and Rudi Giuliani (File 2015) . This concept is very important for Barack Obama, and it was the topic of his first political speech at national level (Obama 2012a In another speech, Obama analysed various historical challenges for American leadership in the twentieth century history of the USA (the Great Depression, Perl Harbour, Vietnam, the economic rise of Japan and the Asian tigers) concluding that the US always managed to overcome these potential problems and to remain a leader (Obama 2012b) . As Obama points out, the USA is therefore an "indispensable nation in world affairs"
and "one of the many examples of why America is exceptional" (ibid).
This attitude implicitly contains a message that a passive policy which would lead toward an abandoning of American leadership would not be considered as part of genuine American exceptionalism in the historical continuum.
Regarding contemporary issues, Obama stated that US engagement and decisiveness to "stop children being gassed to death", such as in Syria, is something that makes the US exceptional (Obama 2013a). Obama even explicitly emphasised the risk to the whole world of American passivity and isolationism in the case of disengagement from regions such as the Middle East:
"Now, I believe such disengagement would be a mistake. I believe America must remain engaged for our own security. But I also believe the world is better for it. Some may disagree, but I believe America is exceptional, in part because we have shown a willingness through the sacrifice of blood and treasure to stand up not only for our own narrow self-interests, but for the interests of all" (Obama 2013b ).
It is important to note that Obama's perception of activism and leadership is not entirely without boundaries. He warned against "reacting to the headlines instead of using our heads" (Obama 2015b ) and explicitly stated that "America is not a world policeman" (Obama 2013a ). In practice, however, it is often hard to distinguish positive active foreign policy from negative "world policeman" foreign policy. Boundaries between these two concepts are usually found in international law, as well as the legitimate interests of other states. It is thus very important to analyse the way Obama perceives these concepts in the context of American exceptionalism. As it can be argued, Obama's perception of the importance of International Law and multilateralism for American exceptionalism is somewhat ambiguous and without clear shape.
Consequently, it is hard to define where precisely the border should be for That's what keeps us strong. That's why we have to keep striving to hold ourselves to the highest of standards: our own" (Obama 2015b ).
In the interview noted above on American exceptionalism during a G20 summit, Obama stated that America's "extraordinary role in leading the world" is not in contradiction to creating partnerships, since the US "can't solve these problems alone" (Obama 2009a ). Obama thinks that US values orienting the country's strategic thinking towards multilateralism.
He pointed out that the American tendency to "think what's good for the world", and not only to think about its own interest, is one of the things that make America exceptional (Obama 2011a ).
This does not mean that unilateralism is completely erased form Obama's American exceptionalism discourse. On the one hand, in his statement on the 2015 National Security Strategy which glorifies the "exceptional role"
of the US, President Obama stated that there is a possibility of unilateral reaction when "core interests" are endangered, although he added that even then it is better to tackle issues multilaterally (Obama 2015c) . In his 2014 West Point address, Obama announced the possibility of the unilateral use of military force, if "core interests demand it" (Obama 2014a ). On the other hand, in the same address (which contains many explicit references to American exceptionalism), President Obama stated that an important element of American leadership was international institutions since "they reduce the need for unilateral American action" (ibid).
It is obvious that multilateralism is something Obama considers essential for
American leadership and exceptionalism, but unilateralism is perceived as something that is not necessarily in contradiction with these concepts, if it is used only when "core interests" are in question. This concept of If we had to describe Obama's approach to the most desirable form of power in two words, the most precise concept would be smart power.
This term was coined by Joseph Nye (2009) to describe the successful combination of hard and soft power instruments. In his speeches President
Obama underlined explicitly and implicitly the need to rely on instruments of both hard and soft power. He claimed that the skill of matching "power with diplomacy" and the wise use of force is something that makes the US exceptional (Obama 2015b ).
Obama put much more emphasis in his speeches on the effectiveness of soft power than on hard power instruments as the core content of American exceptionalism. Earlier diplomatic successes, such as McCain's effort to restore diplomatic ties with Vietnam, were characterised as exceptional (Obama 2012c) , and the restoration of diplomatic ties with Cuba and success of the diplomatic negotiations with Iran were also glorified (Obama 2015b). Obama also claimed that American leadership in science and research (Obama 2014b) , as well as the attractiveness of American universities (Obama 2014c ) is something that makes the US exceptional. He even underlined the importance of the entertainment industry in American superpower status and exceptionalism (Obama 2013c ). American ideals and its internal inclusiveness are, according to Obama's speeches, the essence of the American power to attract people from around the world and of its exceptionalism (Obama 2014d (Obama , 2014e, 2012d . In one of his speeches, Obama emphasised:
"…I travel around the world a lot, and I'm not somebody who expects that other people love their country any less than we love ours, but I will tell you there is something exceptional and special about this country. And there are very few people around the world who wouldn't do everything they could to be citizens of the United States or have the same opportunities that we have" (Obama 2012e ).
In his speeches involving American exceptionalism, Obama also stated his opinion of the lack of hard power in tackling some of the most problematic global issues. The President said that military power is not enough to solve issues such as world terrorism, but that other means are necessary to fight its causes (Obama 2015c) . Ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was also treated as something good for America (Obama 2012b ). Already noted examples of Obama's rhetorical tendency to avoid war solutions can be summarized in his following words -"the American people expect us only to go to war as a last resort" (Obama 2015b ).
Obama definitely favours soft to hard power and emphasises it as more
important for the content of American exceptionalism. It does not, however, mean that President Obama leaves no room for hard power.
On the contrary, although it does not seem so at first sight, he actually leaves a great deal of room for the use of such power as an instrument of foreign policy and also connects it with American exceptionalism.
The "sacrifice of blood and treasure" for global interest is believed by Obama to be part of those things that make America exceptional (Obama 2013b) . He also classified the patriotism of US military servants in this category of exceptionality (Obama 2014f) . It is important to note that while often placing emphasis on ideas and creed as the essence of American exceptionalism, Obama does not negate the importance of the military and economy as aspects of hard power for American exceptionalism, but usually suggests that they are not enough (Obama 2013b ). This does not mean that they are not also important. Obama's message is that they are not enough for exceptionalism on their own, but that they are important, and probably necessary for it.
It is also important to note that Obama avoided using the term "war" in the context of American exceptionalism, but he did not resort to connecting various other instruments based on hard power with this concept. First of all, he congratulated economic coercive instruments, such as economic sanctions, for the pain they impose on the Russian economy (Obama 2015c are threatened, in a "smart" manner.
It is obvious that, despite the constant highlighting of soft power instruments and insisting on the "smart" and bounded use of hard power, Obama's exceptionalism discourse leaves a great deal of space for the legitimate unbounded use of force. Phrases such as "core interests", "national interests", "global interests" or "national security" are essentially contested and there is no consensus regarding the precise content of these categories, which should if necessary be protected even by force.
The meaning of these concepts is shaped by various public actors in the security sector, and the US President is probably the figure with the greatest degree of social capital possession. The President therefore leaves enough space to frame a single issue as a "national security threat" (securitize) in the future, and consequently legitimise the use of force as a necessary special measure for dealing with that threat.
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Obama's speeches on American exceptionalism and international law
In his very first interview after inauguration in 2009, Barak Obama noted "… that the language we use matters" (Obama 2009b) . Although the notion of international law is not so frequently noted in his speeches, there are some important exceptions. We believe this is why it is more illustrative to focus specifically on one of these exceptions in order to show how Obama and their relationship. We are going to focus on the speech Obama gave at West Point on the 28 th of May 2014.
In this part of our paper we claim that Obama uses implicit dual discourse about the relationship between the concept of American exceptionalism and international law. Although on a general level Obama declares that the US should not be exempt from international law norms, he "reserves the right" of the US to use force in international relations in a way which could be hostile to international law norms.
It is interesting to note that in his West Point speech Obama mentioned international law or norms of international law six times (as far as we know, more than in any other of his speeches during his two mandates).
This is intriguing considering the place he made the speech (a military academy).
We would like to underline and subsequently analyse two aspects of Obama's speech at West Point:
1. The part of the speech in which we can identify his understanding of the right of the US to use force in international relations;
2. The part of his speech in which he talks about the general importance of international law and the US stance toward it.
It may be fair to note at the beginning that the principle of the prohibition of threat and use of force in international relations is probably the greatest challenge of all in the context of compliance with norms of international law. This is particularly the case taking into account the position of the US as the only military super-power in the world. We believe that this is the reason special attention should be paid to US self-perception in this field of international relations and international law.
At the beginning of his speech Obama stated that America is an indispensable nation which must always lead on the word stage (Obama 2014a) . At least two interpretations of this statement are possible:
1. America should defend this status by using all necessary means (including its military power) against any state who dares to (even peacefully) challenge this status;
2. The status of a leader on the world stage should be preserved by peaceful and legal instruments.
It seems obvious that the first interpretation is contrary to the international legal order and that the second is complementary: states have a right to compete and enlarge their power, but they have to do that in accordance with the rules of international law.
Obama also noted that:
he United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it -when our people are threatened; when our livelihood is at stake; or when the security of our allies is in danger… America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life".
This is not the terminology of international law and Obama is not obliged
to use it in this kind of speech. It is, however, interesting to see how it fits into the international legal framework. There is a consensus (Bredford and Posner would say it was the core of international law) in the international legal doctrine that the use of force is prohibited by Article 2 (4) 
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Article 42 of the UN Charter: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations".
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Article 51 of the UN Charter: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security". (Corten 2010: 406) . It seems that most states in the international community share this view (Corten 2010: 425) , however, there are also a variety of views suggesting that preventive and/or pre-emptive selfdefence is allowed in international law (Higgins 1963; Wedgwood 2000) .
Until now, the ICJ has noted the concept of preventive self-defence 
Although Obama declared that he believed in American exceptionalism
with every fibre of his being, his interpretation of that exceptionalism in this part of his speech is not hostile to the international legal framework (at least declaratory) because he also stated that the USA can't exempt themselves from the rules that apply to everybody else, and that USA is exceptional in its willingness to affirm international norms through its actions. In our opinion this was a message to the US public and senators rather than to people outside the US.
It therefore seems that Obama's discourse about American exceptionalism and international law rests on two basic, but probably opposite foundations. The first is that, at least generally speaking, the US can't exempt itself from the rules of international law that apply to everybody else. The discourse on the rules of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations reveals that, at least in the most sensitive fields of international relations, the US wants to have almost full freedom to protect their own national interests. The question remains whether it is possible to make peace between these two foundations in order to create a coherent foreign policy which would be in accordance with norms of international law.
Conclusion
Due to its popularity and importance for the American public, American whenever US national interests are threatened. The parallel existence of these two approaches is the reason we describe Obama's American exceptionalism discourse as "dual". Clearer articulation and much more insistence on the first combination is the reason we added the attribute "unbalanced". 
